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Abstract
This paper assesses the performance effects of simultaneous engagement in R&D cooperation with
different partners (competitors, clients, suppliers, and universities and research institutes). We test
whether these different types of R&D cooperation are complements in improving productivity. The
results suggest that the joint adoption of cooperation strategies could be either beneficial or detrimental
to firm performance, depending on firm size and specific strategy combinations. Customer cooperation
helps to increase market acceptance and diffusion of product innovations and enhances the impact of
competitor and university cooperation. On the other hand, smaller firms also face diseconomies in
pursuing multiple R&D cooperation strategies, which may stem from higher costs and complexity of
simultaneously managing multiple partnerships with different innovation objectives.
31. Introduction
Both the industrial organization and the management literature on strategic alliances have devoted substantial
attention to the analysis of R&D cooperation. The industrial organization literature has largely focused on the
effects of R&D cooperation between competing firms on R&D investment and welfare (e.g., Amir et al., 2003;
Martin, 1995; Suzumura, 1992).1 In practice, however, R&D links formed by firms with suppliers, customers, or
research institutes and universities are as frequent as cooperation with competitors, and a substantial share of
innovating firms are engaged in R&D cooperation with several partners simultaneously (Belderbos et al. 2004a,
2004b; Leiponen, 2001; Tether, 2002; Veugelers and Cassiman, 2003).
The alliance literature has emphasized the complexity of rationales behind cooperative strategies and the
need to establish multiple alliances (e.g., Contractor and Lorange, 2002; Das and Teng, 2002; Tyler and
Steensma, 1995). Alliance networks, their determinants, and composition have mostly been studied from the
perspective of social network theory (e.g., Gulati, 1995).
The fact that many firms are engaged in multiple cooperative agreements raises the question whether
there are synergetic effects between these strategies -- i.e., whether forming a new alliance in R&D enhances the
effectiveness of other existing R&D collaborations. Such a synergy, or complementarity, has been formally
defined by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and is assumed to exist if the implementation of one practice or strategy
increases the marginal return to other practices. A number of studies have examined complementary effects of
practices related to workplace organization, use of information technology, and obstacles to innovation
(Bresnahan et al., 2002; Ichniowski et al., 1997; Mohnen and Röller, 2005).
Despite the growing literature on R&D cooperation in both the fields of management and industrial
economics, surprisingly little evidence has emerged on the interaction of different cooperation strategies in
innovation. Aurora and Gambardella (1990) find a positive correlation between residuals of equations explaining
large pharmaceutical firms’ R&D agreements with research institutes, minority participations, and acquisitions
of new biotechnology firms. They take this to indicate that networked R&D strategies are most effective for
firms active in biotechnology. However, Aurora (1996) points out that the testing methodology of correlating
residuals cannot serve as conclusive evidence of the greater effectiveness of joint adoption of the different
1 Exceptions are models that examine vertical cooperation (Steurs, 1995) and vertical alongside competitor cooperation
(Atallah, 2002).
4cooperation strategies.2 Other empirical work has examined the impact of R&D cooperation on firms’ innovation
output: sales of innovative products (e.g., Criscuolo and Haskell, 2003, Faems et al., 2004; Janz et al., 2003;
Klomp and van Leeuwen, 2001; van Leeuwen, 2002; Lööf and Heshmati, 2002) but in most cases aggregated
over cooperation types. Belderbos et al. (2004b) explicitly examine the differential impacts of R&D cooperation
with customers, suppliers, competitors, and research institutes and universities on labor productivity and sales of
innovative products for a large sample of Dutch firms, but do not analyze potential complementarities between
these R&D cooperation strategies.
This paper is the first to examine whether different types of R&D partnerships are complementary. We
distinguish four types of partner-specific innovation strategies: cooperation with competitors, customers,
suppliers, and universities and research institutes. Building on our previous work (Belderbos et al., 2004b), we
analyze the possible complementarities in these cooperation strategies in their effects on labor productivity for a
large sample of innovating firms in two waves of the biannual Dutch Community Innovation Survey (1996,
1998) and production statistics. We apply an appropriate testing framework for complementarity between
multiple practices when these practices are measured as discrete variables. Based on a review of related
theoretical and empirical literature we find that pursuing different types of R&D cooperation, to the extent that
they also relate to pursuit of different innovation objectives and increase managerial costs and complexity, may
not necessarily result in improved performance. Our empirical results suggest mixed effects of joint cooperation
strategies, with substantial differences between large and small firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section two provides a review of the theoretical and
empirical literature on R&D cooperation and firm performance. In section three we describe the model and the
econometric methodology used to examine complementarity between cooperation strategies. The empirical
model, data, and empirical findings are presented in section four. The final section contains our conclusions, a
discussion of caveats, and suggestions for further research.
2 Estimated correlations between residual terms may be the result of common omitted exogenous variables or measurement
errors. Even in the case of robust correlation between practices, there is no guarantee that decision makers were sufficiently
well informed such that they indeed chose efficiency or output enhancing combinations of practices.
52. Literature review
Previous research has argued that different types of R&D cooperation may serve different purposes (Belderbos
et al., 2004a; Teece, 1980). Firms seek cooperation with customers to source new ideas for innovations and to
reduce the risk of uncertainty that is associated with market introduction of these innovations (von Hippel,
1988). Collaboration may also be essential to insure market expansion when products are novel and complex or
when they require adaptations in use by the customers (Tether, 2002).
In contrast, cooperation with suppliers is often related to input quality improvement and cost reductions
through process innovation (Hagedoorn, 1993). Cooperation with rivals is often motivated by the need to share
R&D costs (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003), the pursuit of synergistic effects through pooling of the firms’
resources (Das and Teng, 2000), or dealing with regulations and industry standards (Nakamura, 2003).
Cooperation with universities and research institutes is generally more aimed at radical breakthrough product
innovations that may open up entire new markets or market segments (Monjon and Waelbroeck, 2003; Tether,
2002). Universities are also more likely to be a firm’s partner in new technological fields or when the speed of
technological change is high and commercial outcome of cooperation is uncertain (Belderbos et al., 2004a; Hall
et al., 2003; Rahm et al., 2000).
Few theoretical studies have examined the interaction between different innovation or cooperation
strategies.3 Athey and Schmutzler (1995) consider the simultaneous implementation of two innovation strategies
by a single firm. They find complementarity between product and process innovation strategies. Investments that
improve product design increase output, which in turn increases the returns to process innovations. They also
concede that this complementarity between investments in product and process innovations may not always be
achievable due to the increased demands on information processing capabilities and attention of workers and
managers that they require.4 Lin and Saggi (2002) model R&D cooperation between competitors, where firms
can choose between cooperation in product R&D, process R&D, or both. They find that cooperation in product
R&D leads to increases in both types of R&D, but that full cooperation (in both process and product R&D) leads
to  a  reduction  in  R&D  investments.  This  result  arises  because  cooperation  in  process  R&D  reduces  the
3 Theoretical models that link R&D cooperation and performance have focused primarily on R&D cooperation with a single
competitor (e.g., Cabral, 2000; Kline, 2000; Martin, 1994; Suzumura, 1992).
4 A case study by Henderson and Clark (1990) suggests the importance of such managerial complexities.
6incentives of the firms to invest in R&D in order to compete on costs and price in the output market. In a related
paper, Rosenkrantz (2003) models the simultaneous decisions to engage in R&D cooperation and the levels of
product and process R&D investments. Here cooperation with rival firms leads to a shift in R&D efforts towards
product R&D. Cooperation leads to a reduction in price competition accompanied by reduced output, which
reduces the incentives to engage in process R&D. Atallah (2002) presents a model of spillovers and R&D
cooperation decisions by two vertically related duopolies and generally finds a more positive effect of combined
(both with suppliers and competitors) cooperation strategies. Although results depend on the degree of vertical
and horizontal spillovers that cooperation can internalize, a finding is that the cost-reducing impact of vertical
cooperation leads to increased R&D expenditures under horizontal cooperation.
Leyden and Link (1999) focus on R&D cooperation with public research institutions. They examine the
case of multiple partners in a research joint venture (RJV) involving a public research laboratory. They argue
that an increase in the number of cooperating firms in such a RJV leads to a significant increase in monitoring
costs and a reduced ability of member firms individually to appropriate the research output. These costs and
appropriability issues can outweigh the benefits of the RJV related to economies of technological scope. A
complicating issue in simultaneously managing R&D partnerships with multiple partners is the associated
increase in complexity and coordination costs. Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) point out that a tradeoff exists
between firms’ specialization and coordination. When coordination and communication efforts are dispersed on
multiple cooperation arrangements, this increases the organizational costs of processing and communicating
information. Specialization and focus on collaboration with a smaller set of partners reduces the costs of
communication, and this may offset the benefits of multiple partner cooperation.
The empirical literature on performance effects of R&D cooperation has tended to explore the direct
performance effects of process and product innovation on firm performance (e.g., Geroski, 1991; Huergo and
Jaumandreu, 2004; Vivero, 2004). The majority of empirical models that included R&D cooperation have used
an aggregated cooperation variable and often found a positive impact of engaging in R&D cooperation on
innovation performance: sales of innovative products (e.g., Criscuolo and Haskell, 2003; Janz et al., 2003;
Klomp and van Leeuwen, 2001; van Leeuwen, 2002; Lööf and Heshmati, 2002), patenting (Brouwer and
7Kleinknecht, 1999; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002), sales growth (Cincera et al., 2003), and firms’ stock prices (Wu
and Wei, 1998).
A number of empirical papers have also examined the effect of different cooperation types, but with
ambiguous results. Monjon and Waelbroeck (2003) investigate the effects of collaboration and spillovers on
innovation success, distinguishing between innovations new to the firm (incremental innovations) and
innovations new to the market. They find that cooperation with universities increases the probability of the
introduction of innovations that are new to the market.5 However, cooperation with competitors and (foreign)
suppliers reduces the probability of introduction of such innovations. Cincera et al. (2003) distinguish between
overseas and domestic R&D collaboration by Belgian firms and find a positive impact on productivity of the
latter but a counter-intuitive negative impact of the former. Lööf and Heshmati (2002) include a selected group
of cooperation types in an innovation output equation for Swedish firms and find that cooperation with
competitors and universities affects output levels positively, while cooperation with customers hampers
innovation. Belderbos et al. (2004b) find that supplier and competitor cooperation has a significant impact on
labor productivity growth, while cooperation with customers and universities and research institutes positively
affects growth in sales of innovative (new to the market) products.
The empirical literature on R&D alliances has only recently begun to assess the performance effects of
R&D cooperation (Das and Teng, 2002). One line of research has examined why not all R&D partnerships are
equally profitable. Partnerships in which firms have high compatibility in organizational processes and partner-
specific absorptive capacity allowing for effective transfer of know-how tend to outperform partnerships in
which overlapping knowledge is narrow (Dyer and Singh 1998; Mora-Valentin et al., 2004).6 Other emerging
evidence points out that a network of R&D alliances should be organized such as to minimize redundancies in
knowledge sharing (e.g., Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002) and that large alliance networks are not necessarily
generating the highest innovative output, especially in the presence of product market competition between
consortium members (Bransteter and Sakakibara, 2002).
5 Siegel (2003) finds higher innovative performance for firms located in university science parks, which is likely to be due
to a more intensive interaction and collaboration between firms and universities.
6 Anbarci et al. (2002) also stress the importance of complementarity between cooperating firms’ R&D processes and R&D
inputs in RJVs.
8Overall, previous empirical work appears to suggest a positive impact of R&D cooperation on firm
performance. The complementarity between different R&D cooperation strategies, on the other hand, may be
limited due to increased complexity and cost of managing multiple R&D partnerships with different objectives,
limited time and attention of management and R&D personnel, and possible loss of appropriability when
collaborating  with  public  institutions.  The  first  two  concerns  are  likely  to  be  greater  for  small  firms  than  for
larger firms. In the sections below we explore whether combining individual and multiple R&D cooperation
partnerships increases labor productivity and if these results differ between large and small firms.
3. Complementarity in R&D cooperation strategies
We aim to identify empirically the complementarities that exist between four types of R&D cooperation
strategies: cooperation with competitors, customers, suppliers, and universities. Our methodology follows a
‘production function’ approach, by which we directly estimate the contributions of combinations of strategies to
the relevant output measure. This approach has been shown to be more appropriate than the ‘adoption’ approach
that relies on correlation of residuals from the reduced-form equations (Arora, 1996, Athey and Stern, 1998). To
formalize  the  hypotheses,  we  specify  a  general  production  function  for  the  firm:  the  firm  maximizes  a
performance measure )(xf , with respect to the vector of four R&D cooperation strategies x = (competitor,
customer, supplier, university).
When the practices are measured by continuous variables, complementarity implies that cross-partial
derivatives of the function f with respect to practices are positive (e.g., Baumol et al., 1988). When the practices
have discrete values, the derivatives are replaced by unit differences, and conditions for complementarity can be
expressed as comparisons between combinations of practices. The conditions for complementarity between two
practices (e.g., x1 and x2) correspond to the following four inequalities, where at least one of the inequalities has
to hold strictly: 7
7 This definition is also called ‘strict supermodularity’ (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) and is equal to complementarity in the
conventional sense of scope economies (adoption of practice B strictly increases the marginal returns of adoption of practice
A). If supermodularity is not defined ‘strictly’, it does not exclude the possibility that practice B has no impact on the
returns to practice A.
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These conditions imply that higher returns are achieved when the two practices are used together compared to a
situation when they are used separately, for at least one combination of the other practices. The definition for
substitutability (subadditivity)8 is  identical  to  the definition above except  that  ‘larger’ is  replaced by ‘smaller’.
We can conveniently use an indicator function )u,t,s,r(DI =  to rewrite the function f as:
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where we normalize )0,0,0,0(f  to zero. In the empirical model this implies that we estimate a constant term as
well as 15 dummy variables for exclusive (combinations of) cooperation strategies. Previous research examining
complementarity between more than two practices has often resorted to estimating pair-wise interaction effects.9
This approach is problematic because it omits relevant terms and is prone to an omitted variable bias, which is
likely to lead to incorrect inferences (Lokshin et al., 2004). We apply a proper complementarity or
substitutability test, which requires consideration of the complete set of organizational practices and hence
involves the full set of multiple linear inequality restrictions.10 While the testing methodology allows us to
examine overall complementarity of substitutability between any two practices, the coefficients b  indicate the
performance impact of adopting (combinations of) cooperation strategies compared to a strategy of no R&D
cooperation.
8 It may be argued that the term ‘subadditive’ used in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) better captures the meaning of the
relationship between the strategies. Substitution in our context does not imply that one strategy can be substituted for
another, but rather that their joint use results in suboptimal performance.
9 Recent examples include Black and Lynch (2001), Bresnahan et al. (2002), and Caroli and Van Reenen (2001). Exceptions
are Mohnen and Röller (2005) and Leiponen (2005).
10 The testing procedure is based on a minimum distance or LR test and is outlined in the appendix A: for a more detailed
treatment we refer to Lokshin et al. (2004).
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4. Empirical model, data, and descriptive statistics
We examine the impact of R&D cooperation on the growth in labor productivity from 1996 (t-1) to 1998 (t). We
estimate the following growth in productivity equation:
iii
r s t u
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= )log()log(
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where co=competitor cooperation, su= supplier cooperation, cu=customer cooperation, and un=cooperation with
universities and research institutes. All right hand side variables are measured at time t-1, while
)log()log()log( 1, --=D tiiti prodvprodvprodv  is the growth in productivity from period t-1 to t measured as
value added per employee. The indicator function I captures all exclusive combinations of cooperation strategies
where the case of ‘no cooperation’ is normalized to zero corresponding to equation (2).
Lagged log(Prodv) is the level term of the dependent variable taken in the base year (1996). Firms that
are highly productive and are at the frontier of productivity may be less likely to have strong growth rates in
productivity than firms that are followers. In that case we expect q  to fall within the interval [-1,0]. If q  is zero,
this effect is absent, and there is no gradual convergence between leading firms and productivity laggards. If q
is –1, a productivity lead in one period is fully neutralized in the next, and past productivity has no impact on
future productivity levels.11
Following previous empirical studies we include a number of other variables that are expected to affect
labor productivity growth. These are captured by the vector W. Since many studies have documented a positive
11 To see this one can simply rewrite the relevant part of (1) as ))(1.....()log( 1-+= tt prodvprodv q . In the absence of the
possibility of including fixed firm effects, inclusion of the lagged level term has the advantage that it partly adjusts for
unobserved firm attributes that are relatively constant over time. A related advantage is that it allows for the effects of the
exogenous variables to be interpreted as one-period Granger-causation. The Granger approach to the question of whether x
causes y is to see to what extent the current y is explained by past values of y and then to consider whether adding lagged
values of x can improve the statistical explanation. The variable y is said to be Granger-caused by x if the coefficients on the
lagged values of x are statistically significant
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impact of own R&D on productivity at the firm level (e.g., Grilliches and Mairesse, 1984), our model controls
for the R&D intensity of the firms.
There is a large body of empirical literature examining the sources of productivity growth and in
particular the role of inter-firm knowledge spillovers (e.g., Adams and Jaffe, 1996; Cincera and Van
Pottelsberghe, 2001). These studies have generally confirmed that knowledge spillovers have a positive impact
on productivity growth. The variable ‘spillovers’ is included to control for such external knowledge spillovers.
The  firms  are  asked  in  the  CIS  survey  to  rate  on  a  Likert  scale  the  importance  of  various  external  sources  of
information for the firm’s innovation activities. We include the sum of scores of importance of information from
competitors, suppliers, customers, and universities.12
We want the coefficients for R&D cooperation to measure the full impact of R&D collaboration on
productivity growth. In order to separate the effect of the incoming spillovers from the effect of cooperation
(cooperation can have a direct effect on productivity but will at the same time increase the reported incoming
spillovers from the collaboration partner), we adjust the spillover variables from the influence of formal
cooperation. This is achieved by taking the residuals obtained from regressing the full spillover variable on the
cooperation variable and a set of industry dummies. In this way, we estimate the full impact of formal
cooperation, by separating spillovers due to purposeful informational exchanges that arise in formal cooperative
arrangements  from  spillovers  that  are  not  due  to  such  cooperation  (e.g.,  arising  from  market  contacts  with
suppliers and customers).
The W-vector further includes fixed capital investment, firm size, dummies controlling for foreign and
domestic groups, and dummies for the industry of the firm at the two-digit level. To control for the potential
impact of mergers or acquisitions on the growth of productivity we include a dummy variable ‘merger’, taking
the value 1 if new establishments were acquired during 1994-1996.
Data and Descriptive statistics
12 Several alternative indirect measures of spillovers have been used in previous empirical work -- e.g., based on uncentered
correlation (Jaffe, 1986), Euclidean distance, and geographical distance. According to comparative study of various
spillover measures by Kaiser (2002b) both uncentered correlation and direct measures (used in our model) appear to capture
spillovers quiet accurately.
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The empirical analysis uses data from two consecutive Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) conducted in 1996
and 1998 in the Netherlands, as well as information from the census of manufacturers in the same years.
Variables used in the statistical analysis are listed and described in Table 1, and descriptive statistics are
displayed in Table 2. In total there were 2353 innovating firms with data available in both the 1996 and 1998
surveys. These firms were linked to the production statistics data. The data are at the establishment level and
include manufacturing as well as service firms. Due to the missing values for some of the explanatory variables,
the complete sample includes 1992 firms.13
The distribution of cases by industry and descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 2 and 3. There are 589
firms (30%) with R&D cooperation of any type among the innovating firms in the combined sample. Competitor
cooperation, the focus of much of the industrial organization literature on R&D cooperation, is certainly not the
most frequently adopted cooperation strategy (204 cases). Supplier cooperation is most frequently adopted, with
343 firms indicating to be engaged in this type of strategy, followed by customer cooperation (329 firms), and
university cooperation (249). Some 1403 firms reported to have none of the four types of links. The comparison
across industries indicates that the propensity to cooperate is not dissimilar between services and manufacturing
industries. Cooperation is comparatively more frequent in (petro)chemicals, metals, and business services.
Science-based industries such as electronics and chemicals, but also the food and metal industries, report a
relatively high share of university cooperation.
Table 4 shows the occurrence of particular combinations of cooperation strategies: the number of cases
where the dummies representing exclusive combinations of cooperation strategies take the value 1. Vertical
cooperation is most prominent: supplier only (94), customer only (76), combined (74), or both combined with
university cooperation (40). Some 50 firms have cooperative agreements of all four types. A number of
cooperation strategies are not often combined and have relatively few observations: competitors and suppliers
with or without university cooperation (15, 13), and competitor and customer with or without university
cooperation  (16,  18).  In  the  analysis,  we  make  a  distinction  between  ‘small’ firms,  defined  as  firms  with  less
than 100 employees, and ‘large’ firms. The sub-samples have 836 (large) and 1156 (small) firm observations. As
13 A more detailed description of the data is given in Belderbos et al. (2004a).
13
one would expect, cooperation is most prevalent among large firms. In the sub-samples the number of cases of
particular exclusive combinations of cooperation strategies is further reduced to single digit numbers.14
5. Empirical results
Table 5 reports the results of equation (3) in the first column. Of the single cooperation strategies, competitor
cooperation and supplier cooperation are significantly positive. In two cases, combinations of two strategies have
a positive and significant impact, one triple strategy is positive and significant as well, and so is the strategy of
combining all four types of R&D cooperation. None of the cooperation dummy variables have significantly
negative impacts. Overall, these results clearly confirm a positive impact of R&D cooperation on productivity
growth. A general observation is that the highest coefficients (competitor-customer, competitor-supplier) are
observed for two joint strategies, whereas adding a third or fourth strategy does not increase productivity growth.
The lagged productivity variable is highly significant and negative, indicating that productivity leaders are less
able to show further productivity growth. The estimated coefficient indicates that a one percent higher past
productivity is associated with half of a percent less productivity increase. Incoming knowledge spillovers,
investment intensity, and R&D intensity have the expected positive and significant effects. Productivity growth
is also higher for foreign-owned affiliates, while the merger-variable is insignificant.
The estimation results for equation (3) for the separate samples of small and large firms are presented in
columns 2 and 3 of Table 3. The Chow test rejects the null of no difference between small and large firms. In
general, fewer significant effects are observed, which may be related to the smaller sample sizes and the fact that
the exclusive state dummies include fewer observations. Not one significant effect of adopting a single
cooperation strategy is observed for large firms, while for small firms supplier cooperation has a relatively large
and significant positive impact. Small firms furthermore benefit from combining customer cooperation with
14 We note that this may make it more difficult to estimate the performance impact of such joint strategies with precision.
14
university or competitor cooperation. For large firms there is just one marginal significant impact found for a
combination of supplier and university cooperation.
Looking at the other variables, we find that small firms’ productivity growth benefits from incoming
knowledge spillovers and investment expenditures, while no such evidence is found for large firms. Generally,
large firms’ productivity is much less sensitive to the adoption of R&D cooperation strategies but much more
sensitive to own R&D expenditures. Past productivity has a much lower coefficient (-0.24) for large firms than
for their smaller counterparts (-0.58), indicating that large firms maintain a substantial part of their productivity
lead (76 percent), whereas a leading performance is much more difficult to sustain for smaller firms (only 42
percent).
The complementarity test results are presented in Table 6. For the full sample there are two statistically
significant impacts: the pairs of competitor-customer cooperation and competitor-university cooperation. The
results suggest that combining competitor and customer cooperation gives rise to complementarity in the
innovation process and improves productivity. On the other hand, competitor and university cooperation are
subadditive: when used simultaneously, they weaken productivity growth. This result is consistent with the
suggestion by Leyden and Link (1999) that working simultaneously with a competitor and with public
institutions may limit the appropriability of R&D efforts, as spillovers from universities may leak to non-
collaborating competitors. Another possibility is that competitor cooperation may be geared towards incremental
innovation and university cooperation towards radical innovation, which can be seen as diverging rather than
converging objectives, increasing the complexity of R&D management (Mohnen and Hoareau, 2003).
The results confirm these effects if tests are performed for small firms only. In addition, two more sub-
additive joint R&D cooperation strategies are present for small firms: cooperation with customers and suppliers,
and cooperation with universities and suppliers, while customer and university cooperation are complementary.
An intuitive explanation here is that cooperation with universities focuses on more radical types of product
innovation, for which commercialization often requires customer collaboration to enhance acceptance and
diffusion (Belderbos et al., 2004a; Tether 2002). On the other hand, supplier cooperation tends to focus more
often on cost reduction and incremental process and product innovations, and this innovation strategy may be
more difficult to combine with innovation efforts involving more radical objectives. These findings only hold for
15
small firms, whilst for larger firms none of the combinations leads to significant performance effects. This is
consistent with the notion that lack of management time and increased complexity of the innovation process may
lead to underperformance of  joint  cooperation strategies  in  smaller  firms.  Larger  firms on the other  hand have
more abundant resources and find it less problematic to handle multiple innovations objectives and management
of multiple R&D collaborations.
Caveats and Alternative Specifications
It is useful to note a number of caveats in the above empirical exploration of complementarities in R&D
cooperation strategies. First, although labor productivity is a rather comprehensive performance measure, on
which R&D activities have a major impact, the results may still be dependent on the type of performance
measure used. One may expect that innovation effort geared towards cost reduction has a more direct impact on
productivity than do innovative efforts aimed at creation of entirely new products. The non-significant impact of
university and customer cooperation as single cooperation strategies may hence be partly due to the choice of
performance measure. If university and customer cooperation are more directed towards product innovations
they may have a relatively greater impact on growth rather than on cost reductions and productivity increases.
Second, the insignificant results for large firms may be due to the imperfect (binary) measure of R&D
cooperation strategies. Whereas for small firms a cooperative strategy is in most cases likely to involve a single
collaborative effort, for larger firms the presence of R&D cooperation can hide substantial heterogeneity in the
number  and  scale  of  such  R&D  collaborations.  The  fact  that  large  firms  adopt  specific  R&D  cooperation
strategies is much less informative of the firms’ innovative efforts. Complexity issues are likely to arise within
the group of collaborating firms as a function of the number of collaborative partners of a specific type, rather
than in the combination of R&D partnerships of different types. Hence, we are inclined to consider our analysis
as more representative for the sub-sample of smaller firms.
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We estimated a number of alternative specifications of equation (4) to examine the robustness of the
empirical results. We examined the possibility that the results are affected by reverse causality, if fast-growing
firms have a greater propensity to engage in R&D alliances.15 The empirical literature on the determinants of
R&D cooperation has not provided evidence that firm growth or productivity differences affect the propensity to
collaborate. Mohnen and Heaureau (2003) find no evidence that growth in employment has an effect on the
propensity to cooperate in pooled data for four Western European countries. A “hiring personnel” variable was
not significant in one of the first studies using Dutch CIS data (Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1992). Fritsch and
Lucas (2001) analyzing a large set of German firms find that the value-added-to-sales ratio has no positive effect
on the propensity to engage in R&D cooperation. It is even possible that the most successful innovating firms are
least likely to engage in R&D alliances because they are in a better position to go it alone and may face risks of
knowledge dissipation.16 Nevertheless, we investigated potential reverse causality by including past productivity
growth (in the period 1995-1996, the year preceding the measurement of R&D collaboration) as an additional
independent variable. The results from these models including past productivity growth were comparable to
those presented in the paper, while the productivity variable itself was not significant. The results suggest that
our empirical results do not under- or over-estimate the impact of R&D collaboration due potential reverse
causality.
We also tried variables controlling for different objectives of firms’ innovation strategies, with a
potential impact on productivity growth. We distinguished “cost push” objectives (the importance of cost-saving
objectives for innovation) and “demand pull” objectives (the importance of demand-enhancement objectives for
innovation). These variables were not significant, and they did not affect the estimates of the other variables. We
also estimated our model separately for manufacturing and services firms and performed the Chow test for the
hypothesis that the coefficient vectors are not different for the two sectors. The Chow test statistic is 1.08 with
(42, 1908) df, and, hence, we could not reject the hypothesis that the coefficient vectors are the same for the
manufacturing and service firms in our sample.
15 Generally, the literature has identified incoming spillovers as well as appropriability conditions as the most important
determinants of R&D collaboration decisions (see, for example, Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Belderbos et al., 2004a).
16 We thank the two referees for bringing up these points.
17
Finally, we examined different lags between R&D (cooperation) and productivity growth (e.g. Cincera
et al., 2003). We found that the model with a 2-year lag (as presented in Table 5) had a substantially better fit
than models with longer (3 and 4 year) lags, while no substantial differences in results were found. Models with
longer lags may not accurately pick up the effects of the measured cooperation strategies, if during the 2-4 year
period firms engage in (unmeasured) new collaborative agreements that have additional impacts on productivity
growth. The shorter (2-year) lag between performance and R&D collaboration helps to avoid such
‘contamination’ due to later changes in R&D collaboration strategies.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed possible complementarities in cooperation strategies as they affect labor productivity
growth for a large sample of innovating firms in two waves of the biannual Dutch Community Innovation
Survey (1996, 1998). We distinguished four types of partner-specific innovation strategies: cooperation with
competitors, customers, suppliers and universities and research institutes. We allowed for an appropriate time lag
with which the impact of R&D cooperation (1996) feeds through in productivity growth (1996-1998) and
applied a robust testing framework for complementarity between multiple practices based on multiple inequality
constraints. This test indicates whether the impact of the adoption of one cooperative strategy significantly
increases if another practice is adopted simultaneously. The results confirmed a positive impact overall of R&D
cooperation on labor productivity growth, but with distinct differences in magnitude and significance of impacts
depending on (combinations of) cooperation types. Competitor and supplier cooperation had the most direct
positive impact on productivity growth. The empirical results on complementarities were mixed.
Complementarity was found for joint cooperation strategies with competitors and customers, and with customers
and universities. This is likely to be related to the role of customer cooperation in facilitating commercialization
and quicker diffusion of product innovations that are due to competitor and university cooperation.
At the same time, a number of instances were found where the combination of cooperation strategies
leads to underperformance: supplier cooperation combined with either university or competitor cooperation, and
competitor cooperation combined with university cooperation. The former result may be explained by diverging
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objectives of different collaborative efforts: supplier cooperation tends to focus more often on cost reduction and
incremental and process innovations, and this innovation strategy may be more difficult to combine with
innovation efforts involving more radical product innovations associated with university and competitor
collaboration. The combination of competitor and university collaboration may suffer from threats to
appropriability of R&D efforts when working simultaneously with a competitor and public institutions, as
spillovers from university may leak to competitors not involved in the collaboration (Leyden and Link, 1999).
These significant performance effects of combined cooperation strategies were found for small firms,
while no significant impact was found for larger firms. On the one hand, this may be due to our inability to
measure  the  actual  importance  of  R&D partnerships  for  large  firms  as  we  could  not  measure  the  number  and
importance of different cooperation strategies. On the other hand, the differences between small and large firms
is consistent with the notion that a lack of management time and the increased complexity of the innovation
process is most likely to result in underperformance of joint cooperation strategies in small firms. In general the
empirical results support such an ‘increasing complexity’ hypothesis and show a decreasing marginal impact of
multiple cooperation strategies in particular when these imply multiple objectives.
The results of our analysis also raise a number of questions, which suggest pertinent issues for further
research. Given the mixed findings on the benefits of pursuing multiple cooperation strategies simultaneously
and  the  suggestion  that  complexity  issues  play  a  role  here,  a  natural  extension  of  analysis  is  to  examine  the
impact of different cooperation strategies when adopted sequentially. This will require the construction of panel
data, utilizing data from more than two innovation surveys. Other extensions concern the analysis of potential
differences in the performance effects of R&D cooperation across industries, and the robustness of results for
different performance measures than labor productivity.
A  problem  that  is  not  easily  solved  is  the  lack  of  an  indicator  of  the  scale  or  number  of  R&D
collaborations of each type in the European Community innovation survey data used here. To examine
accurately the impact of R&D cooperation for larger firms, information on the number and importance of such
partnerships may be indispensable. Here an alternative approach would be to utilize databases on R&D alliances
that have been the subject of analysis in most of the management literature. Last but not least, empirical analysis
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in this area could greatly benefit from more theoretical work on combined R&D cooperation strategies and, in
particular, the role of collaboration with partners other than competitors.
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Table 1 Description of Variables
variable name Definition
Competitor cooperation 1 if the business unit reported engagement in innovation in cooperation strategy with
competitors, else zero
Supplier cooperation 1 if the business unit reported engagement in innovation in cooperation strategy with
suppliers, else zero
Customer cooperation 1 if the business unit reported engagement in innovation in cooperation strategy with
customers, else zero
University cooperation 1 if the business unit has reported engagement in innovation in cooperation strategy with
universities, innovation centers, or research institutions, else zero
Incoming spillovers Constructed as residual from the auxiliary regression of sum of scores of importance of
university, competitor, and supplier spillovers taken from 1998 survey on a cooperation
dummy taken from 1996 survey. In this way, we adjust the spillover variable from the
influence of formal cooperation such that the estimated coefficients for R&D cooperation
measure the full impact of R&D collaboration on productivity growth.
Investment intensity Capital investment expenditures/sales
R&D intensity Total innovation expenditures/sales
Firm size Logarithm of the number of employees
Domestic group 1 if the business unit is part of a domestic firm grouping, else 0
Foreign multinational 1 if the firm is an affiliate of a foreign multinational, else 0
Merger 1 if the firm has acquired or merged with other firm(s) in the period 1994/1996, else 0.
Productivity growth (value
added)
Growth in the net value added per employee = log (labor productivity 1998) – log (labor
productivity 1996)
Note: all independent variables are for 1996 except for the spillover variables
Table 2 Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
Mean S.D.
Cooperation with:
Competitors 0.021 0.142
Suppliers 0.047 0.212
Customers 0.038 0.191
Universities 0.020 0.140
Suppliers, universities 0.016 0.124
Customers, universities 0.015 0.122
Customers, suppliers 0.034 0.189
Customers, supplier and universities 0.020 0.140
Competitors, universities 0.013 0.114
Competitors and suppliers 0.007 0.080
Competitors and suppliers and universities 0.008 0.086
Competitors and Customers 0.008 0.088
Competitors and customers and universities 0.008 0.086
Competitors and customers and suppliers 0.013 0.114
Competitors, customers suppliers, universities 0.025 0.156
Log(value added per employee) in 1996 3.662 0.636
Investment intensity 0.020 0.053
Spillovers 0.008 4.667
Firm size 4.472 1.154
R&D intensity 0.007 0.019
Foreign MNE 0.205 0.404
Domestic group 0.271 0.445
# observations 1992
Table 3. Distribution of firms across industries and R&D cooperation strategies
NACE Sector No.
of
obs.
in
sam
ple
Share
%
Share
non-
coop
No of
obs
Share if
COcoop=1
No
of
obs
Share if
Scoop=1
No
of
obs
Share if
CUcoop=1
No
of
obs
Share if
Ucoop=1
No
of
obs
   11,14 Mining 6 0.3 0.4 5 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.4 1
   15,16 Food 128 6.4 6.3 89 6.7 14 7.9 27 6.7 22 10.8 27
  17 – 19 Textile 51 2.6 2.7 38 2.9 6 2.6 9 2.1 7 3.2 8
     21 Paper 59 3.0 2.7 38 3.9 8 4.7 16 3.6 12 5.2 13
     22 Printing, publishing 67 3.4 3.8 54 1.5 3 2.3 8 1.2 4 0.8 2
   23,24 Petroleum and
chemicals
85 4.3 3.5 49 4.9 10 4.4 15 8.2 27 6.8 17
     25 Rubber and plastic 74 3.7 3.2 46 4.9 10 4.4 15 5.8 19 3.2 8
     27 Basic Metals 21 1.1 0.8 11 1.0 2 1.7 6 1.8 6 2.0 5
     28 Metal products 146 7.3 7.3 103 5.9 12 8.2 28 7.9 26 7.2 18
     29 Machines, equipment 170 8.5 9.6 134 3.9 8 5.2 18 6.4 21 5.2 13
  30 - 33 Electronics 122 6.1 5.9 83 5.4 11 6.1 21 7.9 26 8.0 20
   34,35 Cars and Transport 82 4.1 3.8 54 6.8 14 4.7 16 4.3 14 5.6 14
20,26,36,37  Other manufacturing 147 7.3 7.8 109 7.8 16 5.8 20 5.8 19 6.0 15
   40,41 Utilities 22 1.1 0.8 11 2.9 6 1.5 5 1.2 4 2.8 7
     45 Construction 131 6.6 7.4 104 5.9 12 4.4 15 2.1 7 5.6 14
  50 - 55 Hotel, catering 359 18.0 18.1 255 16.2 33 19.8 68 17.0 56 10.4 26
  60 - 64 Transportation,
storage
82 4.1 4.6 64 3.4 7 3.2 11 4.3 14 0.8 2
  70 - 74 Business services 212 10.6 9.8 137 14.7 30 11.4 39 11.8 39 14.5 36
   90,93 Environmental,
other services
28 1.4 1.4 19 1.0 2 1.7 6 1.8 6 1.2 3
Total 1992 100.0 100.0 1403 100.0 204 100.0 343 100.0 329 100.0 249
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Table 4. Contingency table: Distribution of cooperation cases
Cooperation type
Number of
cases
Number of
cases small
firms
Number of
cases large
firms
None 1403 909 494
Competitors 41 25 16
Customers 76 50 26
Supplier 94 35 59
University 40 14 26
Competitors and suppliers 13 7 6
Competitors and customers 16 10 6
Competitors and university 26 10 16
Customers and suppliers 74 31 43
Supplier and university 31 13 18
Customers and university 30 10 20
Competitors, customers, suppliers 26 12 14
Competitors, suppliers, university 15 3 12
Competitors, customers, university 17 3 14
Customers, suppliers and university 40 12 28
Competitors, customers, suppliers, universities 50 12 38
Total 1992 1156 836
Note: The R&D cooperation categories represent exclusive (combinations of) cooperation types: numbers represent the
number of firms that are only engaged in the listed types of R&D partnerships.
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Table 5. Estimates of Equation (3): determinants of firm productivity growth, 1996-1998
(1) (2) (3)
All firms Small firms Large firms
Log(productivity)96 -0.475***
(0.066)
-0.582***
(0.076)
-0.241
(0.037)***
Investment intensity 0.281***
(0.110)
0.309***
(0.108)
0.172
(0.384)
R&D intensity 1.853**
(0.844)
0.217
(2.024)
2.829***
(0.586)
Incoming spillovers 0.006**
(0.002)
0.006*
(0.003)
0.001
(0.002)
Firm size 0.025**
(0.016)
0.039*
(0.040)
0.028
(0.018)
Foreign group 0.100***
(0.032)
0.127**
(0.055)
0.074**
(0.036)
Domestic group 0.034
(0.022)
0.036
(0.033)
0.040
(0.028)
Merger -0.035
(0.026)
-0.058
(0.045)
-0.016
(0.027)
Industry dummies YES YES YES
R&D Cooperation:
Competitor 0.096**
(0.044)
0.081
(0.058)
0.072
(0.076)
Customer -0.041
(0.066)
0.002
(0.087)
-0.034
(0.048)
Supplier 0.057*
(0.032)
0.142**
(0.064)
0.010
(0.035)
University 0.016
(0.061)
0.155
(0.116)
-0.101
(0.068)
Competitor, supplier 0.250
(0.171)
0.519
(0.317)
0.020
(0.093)
Competitor, customer 0.215**
(0.089)
0.256***
(0.086)
0.101
(0.152)
Competitor, university 0.080
(0.077)
-0.031
(0.112)
0.096
(0.096)
Supplier, customer -0.004
(0.046)
-0.048
(0.077)
0.012
(0.052)
Supplier, university 0.108
(0.075)
-0.001
(0.070)
0.142*
(0.083)
Customer, university 0.014
(0.073)
0.201**
(0.097)
-0.141
(0.089)
Competitor, customer, supplier 0.140
(0.102)
0.150
(0.122)
0.155
(0.172)
Competitor, supplier, university -0.004
(0.072)
-0.041
(0.091)
0.047
(0.103)
Competitor, customer, university 0.103*
(0.064)
0.132
(0.218)
0.027
(0.056)
Customer, supplier, university 0.047
(0.058)
-0.068
(0.115)
0.017
(0.059)
Competitor, customer, supplier, university 0.069
(0.045)
0.088
(0.111)
0.000
(0.053)
Observations 1992 1156 836
R-squared 0.35 0.46 0.18
RSS 331.54 219.63 88.09
F( 41,  n={1950,1114,794}) 25.88*** 22.85*** 4.23***
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. The Chow test (3.52) rejects no difference b/w large and small firms.
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Table 6. Tests for complementarity and substitutability (subadditivity) between cooperation strategies
All Large firms Small firms
Complements
LR ³
Substitutes
LR £
Complements
LR ³
Substitutes
LR £
Complements
LR ³
Substitutes
LR £
(3) (4)
Competitors and Customers 8.799** 0.223 1.958 0.048 4.583 0.987
Competitors and Suppliers 0.897 4.611 0.003 6.951 4.501 0.117
Competitors  and University 0 18.357*** 1.199 3.179 0 12.817***
Customers and Suppliers 0.175 3.537 0.739 0.410 0 13.612***
Customers and University 2.701 0.705 0 3.804 6.964* 0.002
Suppliers and university 0.219 4.472 6.364 0.368 0.040 16.560***
Note: The reported LR statistics is for the test of the null hypothesis of the absence of complementarity (substitutability) for a given pair of strategies.
The superscripts *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The log-likelihood values are given in the Appendix.
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Appendix. Testing for complementarity and substitutability
This section describes the definition and conditions concerning complementarity and substitutability for the case
of dichotomous practices. Consider an objective function f(.) of which the value is determined by the practices xp
(p=1,...,n). We use the following definition of complementarity (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990):
Practices x1 and x2 are considered complementary in the function f if and only if
)x,...,x,x,x(f)x,...,x,x,x(f)x,...,x,x,x(f)x,...,x,x,x(f nnnn 321321321321 1111 +++³+++
with the inequality holding strictly for at least one value of )x,...,x( n1 .
The definition for substitutability is identical to definition 1 except that the inequality is reversed.
The above definition can be more conveniently rewritten in terms of the possible combinations of
practices. With two practices, the collection of possible combinations is defined in the usual binary order
as }),(),,(),,(),,({D 11011000= . The set D has 16 elements when there are four practices, and the conditions
of complementarity correspond to the four inequalities of type 1-a – 1-d discussed in section 3 of the paper.
The production function estimation is set up as a quadratic minimization problem subject to the Kuhn-
Tucker restrictions. These inequality restrictions are imposed on the slope coefficients of the corresponding 15
‘state’ dummy variables, representing the exclusive combinations of four practices corresponding to equations 1-
a – 1-d. Each equation is estimated in both restricted and unrestricted forms, and, subsequently, Wald and LR
tests can be used to test the imposed inequality restrictions. In this paper, we use the LR test.
In  the  case  of  more  than  two  practices,  the  number  of  inequality  constraints  that  have  to  be  tested
simultaneously is 22 -n . Statistical tests of rR:H =b0  versus rR:H a ³b  with R having rank k in the
standard linear model eb += Xy  with one of the inequalities holding strictly have been considered in
Gouriéroux, Holly, and Monfort (1982). Kudô (1963, p.414) derived the theorem underlying this test. From this
theorem it follows that in the case of p inequality restrictions we have that the probability of LR exceeding c
under the null hypothesis equals a mixed chi-square distribution of å
=
³
p
i
ipi w}cPr{
0
2c .  The  statistic  can  be
compared to Table 1 from Kodde and Palm (1986) who provide critical values ( lc  and uc ) for the significance
levels ranging in size from 0.25 to 0.001 and degrees of freedom from 1 to 40.
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